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Education Fever and the East Asian Fertility Puzzle:  A Case 
Study of Low Fertility in South Korea 
 
Thomas M. Anderson1 and Hans-Peter Kohler2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Fertility throughout East Asia has fallen rapidly over the last five decades and is now 
below the replacement rate of 2.1 in every country in the region.  While similar but less 
extreme declines occurred throughout Europe during this same period, the declines to 
lowest-low fertility during the 1990s have been reversed in the last ten years as the pace 
of tempo changes (i.e., the postponement of childbearing) has slowed. Recent literature 
has shown that many European countries have in fact also experienced increases in 
cohort fertility.  No such widespread fertility reversal has occurred in East Asia, where 
family size (i.e., cohort fertility) continues to decline. In this paper we seek to explain the 
precipitous (and in some cases, continual) fertility declines in East Asia.  Using South 
Korea as a case study, we argue that East Asia’s ultra-low fertility rates can be partially 
explained by the steadfast parental drive to have competitive and successful children.  
Parents throughout the region invest high amounts of time and money to ensure their 
children are able to enter prestigious universities and obtain top jobs.  Accordingly, 
children have become so expensive that the average couple cannot afford to have more 
than just one or two.  We argue that the trend of high parental investment in child 
education, also known as “education fever”, exemplifies the notion of “quality over 
quantity” and is an important contributing factor to understanding low-fertility in East 
Asia.   
 
Background 
Recent fertility increases in Europe over the last 10 years have somewhat 
ameliorated the concerns about low fertility and its implications for population aging and 
declining population sizes. These increases in TFR and related fertility measures have 
been interpreted by many as providing a more optimistic outlook for the demographic 
trends in Europe and some other highly developed countries.  Specifically, fertility rates 
in all but one European country have emerged from “lowest-low” fertility (TFR of 1.3 or 
less), and many countries seem likely to experience further fertility increases (Kohler et 
al. 2002; Goldstein et al. 2009; Myrskylä et al. 2009).  These increases have been 
documented in both period and cohort fertility. While some European countries (e.g. 
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) have regained TFR levels near replacement level 
fertility after sustained periods of lower fertility, others countries persist with relatively 
low fertility levels – even if it is higher than the TFR levels observed in the 1990s and 
2000s (e.g. Spain, Italy, and Portugal).  Although low fertility in Europe will in all 
likelihood continue to be an important topic for social scientists and policy makers, from 
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today’s perspective it seems reasonable to predict that most countries in Europe, as well 
as the continent in its aggregate, have experienced their “natality nadir” in terms of the 
all-time lowest TFR levels, and that future fertility is likely to be higher – and in many 
cases, substantially higher – than the levels observed during the last 20 years.3 One 
manifestation of this expectation, for instance, is reflected in the most recent UN World 
Population Prospects that assume a long-term convergence of TFR to near-replacement 
level, a revision from earlier forecasts that assumed a convergence to a persistent below-
replacement TFR (United Nations 2011).  
 The renewed modest optimism towards the future of European fertility stems 
from recent literature pointing to childbearing postponement (a form of tempo changes) 
as the culprit for Europe’s natality nadir (Goldstein et al. 2009; Kohler et al. 2002 and 
2006) and analyses that suggest that TFR levels might be pushed upward through 
quantum increases in the most advanced countries (Mryskala et al. 2009), especially 
when high levels of development are combined with high levels of gender equality 
(Myrskylä et al. 2011).  According to Goldstein et al. (2009) “formerly lowest-low 
fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of 
shifts to later childbearing become less important”.  This trend may be reinforced if there 
are indeed quantum increases that elevate fertility from very low levels as countries reach 
higher development levels.  These claims are supported by new cohort fertility forecasts 
from Myrskylä et. al (2012) which show that cohort fertility has stopped falling and will 
likely increase in many developed countries, including places most known for and 
frequently studied because of their low fertility such as Italy, Germany, and Russia. 
Like Europe, period fertility in East Asian countries has probably reached its all-
time low.  Key demographic indicators provide evidence that tempo changes due to 
postponed marriage and childbearing have had and continue to have profound impacts on 
the region’s low fertility rate.  The mean age of first marriage, which has risen across the 
region over the last 15 years, is likely attributable to the fact that East Asian women now 
study longer and enter the labor force at later ages. Given the close link between marriage 
and childbearing in East Asia, the age at first birth has essentially changed in tandem with 
the age at first marriage (Suzuki 2003).   The heightened standard of living and 
opportunities for social mobility make one’s “20s” a time to travel, grow, and seize career 
advancement opportunities.  In fact, Choe and Cho (2005) note that single [Korean] 
women are likely to invest more time in their job in order to improve their chances to 
return to it after raising children, thus further driving delayed marriage.  Given the ability 
East Asian women have to work and lead financially solvent lives, many do not feel the 
degree of financial pressure they once did to “rush into marriage”. 
The effects of the postponement transition in East Asia (i.e., women marrying and 
concomitantly having children at later ages) are likely to have temporarily suppressed the 
region’s TFRs to all-time lows of 1.08 in Korea (2005), .9 in Hong Kong (2003), 1.15 in 
Singapore (2010), 1.26 in Japan (2006), and .9 in Taiwan (2010) (World Bank 2011).   
While these short- and medium term trends are similar to those that have been observed 
in Europe, East Asian countries are distinct in the longer-term magnitude of their fertility 
decline. 
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In sharp contrast to Europe, where lowest-low levels of fertility were primarily 
driven by childbearing postponement (Goldstein et al. 2009) and have risen due to 
fertility recuperation among older ages (Myrskylä et al. 2012), cohort fertility has fallen 
dramatically throughout East Asia.  As Frejka et al. (2010) state, “very few of the 
postponed births [have been] recuperated” and as a result, completed cohort fertility rates 
are “as low as, or lower than, the lowest rates in Europe” (Frejka et al. 2010).  Frejka et 
al.’s findings are confirmed by Myrskylä et al’s (2012) cohort fertility projections which 
project the East Asian countries of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore to experience 
further declines in completed cohort fertility (below 1.4 for the 1979 birth cohort), and 
Japan’s CFR to plateau at a very low 1.45.   
The following Figure 1 dissects the Korean fertility decline by looking at 
percentages of completed fertility parities for women born from 1930 to 1960.   
According to the Figure, of the women born between 1930-1934 (most of whom entered 
their childbearing years in the 1950s/1960s), 95.3% had (at least) one child, while about 
90% had (at least) two children, 83% had three children, 68% had four children, and 46% 
had five or more children. When looking at completed fertility of 5 year age cohorts from 
1935 to 1960, we note that the percentage of women with at least one child decreased 
only slightly (from 95% to 93%), while the percentage of families with (at least) two 
children fell moderately, the percentage of three children families decreased drastically, 
and families of four+ children fell to nearly nonexistent.  Fig. 1 thus documents the well-
known pattern of stopping behavior as the primary driving force behind the Korean 
fertility decline in cohorts born during 1930—60, rather than an increase in the fraction 
of women foregoing motherhood (though childlessness has slightly risen). For cohorts 
born after 1955, there is a clear shift towards single or two child families, in a sharp 
contrast to cohorts born around 1930 that had fairly high fertility.  
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Figure 1:  Proportions at Different Parities of Completed Births to Women Born 1930-1960 
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In this paper we attempt to explain why East Asia, the region at the lowest end of 
the fertility spectrum, has experienced such dramatic and continual declines in fertility.  
We first discuss how East Asian family structures and gender norms have impacted the 
region’s fertility transition.  We then turn to a crucial piece of the East Asian fertility 
puzzle:  education fever.  Education fever, and by extension, “competitiveness” and 
“English” fever, refers to the high parental investment in education by East Asian parents.  
In such ultra-competitive, status-driven societies, the cost of children in many East Asian 
countries has become so high that many couples are turning to single or two child 
families. 
Our analyses, data, and majority of discussion focus on South Korea (“Korea”, 
hereinafter) as a case study for East Asia.  We concentrate on Korea because (1) Korea 
has experienced the greatest fertility decline over the last 5 decades among OECD 
countries; (2) Korea has the highest participation rates of private education in the region, 
making it an exemplary case to study the relationship between low fertility and private 
education expenditures4; and (3) the government collected data on private education 
expenditures in Korea is the most extensive in the region.    Nonetheless, most of the 
topics covered in this paper (such as familial structures and the relationship between 
private education and low fertility) are widespread throughout East Asia.  Private places 
of learning similar to the Korean hagwon, for example, are frequented by the majority of 
children in Japan and Taiwan (where they are known as “jukus” and “buxibans”, 
respectively), and by a sizeable fraction of children in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
While this paper uses Korea as a case study for the region, it should be kept in mind that 
the link between having successful offspring (achieved through high investment in 
education) and low fertility in East Asia is widely recognized as a broad regional 
phenomenon that shares important commonalities across the various countries (discussed 
in more detail below). 
 
Fertility and Family Structures in Developed Countries 
While Europe and East Asia can broadly be grouped together for having below-
replacement fertility, over the last few decades we have witnessed a clear divide emerge 
among below-replacement countries, separating them into countries with moderately-low 
fertility (TFR of 1.7 to 2.1), low fertility (1.3-1.7) and lowest-low fertility (under 1.3) 5. 
Moderately low fertility countries are primarily concentrated in Northern and Western 
Europe while low and lowest-low fertility countries are found in Southern and Eastern 
Europe and East Asia. Moreover, as has been pointed out before, lowest-low fertility has 
almost exclusively moved to Asia, with no lowest-low fertility country remaining in 
Europe (with the exception of Moldova) as of 2008 (Goldstein et al. 2009). 
While the intent of this paper is not to give a cross country comparison on low 
fertility determinants, it is important to evince that many social dynamics and cultural 
norms with regard to the family and gender equality in South Korea (and East Asia) 
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parallel those of Southern Europe and differ from those of Northern and Western Europe.  
Specifically, scholars have pointed to a dichotomy of family structure within the 
developed world over the last century: strong familism and weak familism.  This 
dichotomy is closely related to fertility levels, as “strong familism” countries almost 
always have low or lowest-low fertility while “weak familism” countries typically have 
moderately low to stable fertility. Table 1 contains noteworthy characteristics of strong 
familism and weak familism. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Weak and Strong Familism 
          Strong Familism 
• Late parental home move out (“late nest 
leaving”) 
• Traditional gender roles 
• Strong family ties 
• Very low out of wedlock births 
• Cohabitation not very common 
• Often linked to religion, ideology, or ethical and 
philosophical system (e.g. Confucianism, 
Catholicism) 
• Mothers as primary caregivers 
• Women take on household responsibilities 
• Low (TFR of 1.3-1.7) or lowest-low (TFR of or 
below 1.3) fertility levels common 
• Southern Europe, East Asia, Eastern Europe 
Weak Familism 
• Premarital parental home move out (“early 
nest leaving”) 
• High degree of individual autonomy 
• Lowered parental authority  
• Cohabitation common 
• High use of childcare, babysitters, and 
nannies 
• Housework is shared relatively equally by 
both men and women 
• Moderately low or near replacement level 
(TFR of 1.7-2.1) common 
• Northern and Western Europe 
(Source: Reher 1998) 
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 Strong and weak familism are largely shaped by their defining characteristics.  As 
we later discuss, weak familism fosters a progressive and egalitarian household 
environment that comfortably aligns with economic development and social 
modernization.  This nurtures a childbearing-friendly society and provides a partial 
explanation for why fertility is relatively high in weak familism countries.  In strong 
familism countries, economic development and social modernization clash with 
traditionalism in the household.  This clash creates an environment in which women face 
obstacles in balancing home and work life. 
Women with children in strong familism countries are almost always relegated as 
the primary caregivers, in charge of managing “unpaid work” or household tasks, and in 
many cases, expected to work. Balancing a job, a family, and daily household chores is 
both physically and mentally taxing on women, and makes the prospects of having a 
large family (three or more children) difficult. Furthermore, career oriented, 
individualistic women in strong familism countries may perceive marriage and 
childbearing as threatening, as they can interfere with women’s self-aspirations or goals. 
As a result, women in strong familism societies often delay marriage and childbearing 
until later ages and in some cases, forego the two entirely.   
 Weak familism societies, on the other hand, tend to foster environments in which 
the mother and father can lead both domestic and professional lives.  Government 
subsidized daycare and high use of babysitters and nannies are highly prevalent in weak 
familism societies.  These “outside care” sources take much of the burden off of mothers 
to act as the “primary caregiver” and facilitate women in balancing their roles as both 
workers and mothers.  Additionally, the amount of household chores (“unpaid work”) is 
much more evenly split between men and women in weak familism societies than in 
strong familism societies, thus creating a less burdensome situation for mothers. 
 Lastly, social norms regarding the institution of marriage vary in weak familism 
and strong familism countries.  In the former, marriage still remains a strong institution 
but is more of a formality or legal contract as opposed to a religious or social pathway 
“permitting” one to cohabit and have children.  As a result, cohabitation is quite normal 
and out-of-wedlock births comprise a significant share (if not majority) of total births.  In 
strong family societies, conservative social norms dictate marriage as an important step 
before cohabiting or childbearing.  This explains why strong familism countries have 
significantly lower levels of cohabitation and even lower levels of out-of-wedlock births.     
 A growing body of literature supports the idea that in developed countries, a high 
level of gender equality is essential in fostering a child friendly society.  Myrskylä et al. 
(2011), for example, argue that very low fertility is most prevalent in countries “high in 
health, income and education but low in gender equality”.  Their argument appropriately 
fits within the framework of strong and weak familism, as the former is characterized by 
a low degree of gender equality and very low fertility and the latter tends to have high 
gender equality and relatively high fertility.   
 In Table 2, four strong familism countries (e.g. South Korea, Japan, Italy, and 
Spain)6 are compared with four weak familism countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) using key characteristics.   
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The “percent of 15-29 year olds living at home” illustrates that nest leaving is rather late in strong familism societies and early in 
others.  Difference in unpaid work indicates how many more minutes women spend a day doing household chores than men.   The 
enrollment percentage of “out-of-school” childcare refers to the use of non-parental childcare, and sheds light on the high use of 
outside source childcare in weak familism countries and the low use of outside source childcare in strong familism countries.  The 
data were nationally collected and compiled by the OECD, though the age ranges corresponding to each country vary slightly (6-
10 years old in Italy, 6-8 in Korea, 6-11 in Japan, 3-5 in Spain, 7-9 in Finland, 6-8 in Denmark and Sweden, and 3-10 in Norway).  
Lastly, the Global Gender Gap Index, a measure of gender inequality, indicates the “rank” of each country (out of 192 countries, 1 
being the most gender equal country and 192 being the least).  The fertility rate of each country is included to stress that weak 
familism countries have much higher fertility than strong familism countries. 
 
Sources:  TFR:-World Bank (2011); % Living at Home: European and World Values Survey 1999 (Denmark), 2005 (Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Finland), 2006 (Sweden), 2007 (Spain and Norway); Unpaid Work Difference-OECD 2010; % Enrollment rate: 
Out-of-school childcare-OECD 2011b, OECD 2006; Global Gender Gap Index 2010: Hausmann et al. 2010 
 
Table 2:  Key Characteristics of Strong and Weak Familism in Selected Countries 
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Like other strong familism countries, Korea also has very conservative traditions 
with regard to household and gender roles.  The country has experienced economic 
prosperity over the last fifty years, but despite the technological, economic, and social 
advances, Korea still harbors high gender inequality and long-established social norms.  
As highlighted, based on the recent theories and empirical evidence that points to gender 
equality as an important factor facilitating moderately low, rather than very low or 
lowest-low fertility in developed societies (Myrskylä et al. 2011; McDonald 2002), this 
“clash” between economic development/social modernization and household 
traditionalism foments a society almost destined to have persistent very low fertility.  
Korean mothers primarily hold the responsibility for raising their children.  This 
deeply rooted norm coupled with a lack of public childcare facilities and high childcare 
costs make it difficult for the average woman to evade this societal expectation.  
Additionally, Korean women assume responsibility for the majority of rudimentary 
household tasks from cooking to cleaning (Jones 2011).  After the 1997 financial crisis, 
Korean men who once insisted on being the single breadwinner came to realize the 
financial advantage of a working wife and began to favor employed women when 
searching for a wife (Eun 2007).  This not only made it more socially acceptable for 
women to work but also encouraged them to do so.  Now, women who decide to marry 
and have children often find it physically and mentally strenuous to raise multiple 
children while also having to manage the majority of household chores and in many cases, 
work a job (see Caldwell and Caldwell 2005).  The obstacle faced by mothers to balance 
their work and home lives—stemming mainly from high gender inequality—has an 
immeasurable yet undoubtedly important influence on Korea’s low fertility rate.   
 Familial traditionalism and gender inequality in highly economically and 
technologically advanced countries are not particular to Korea. Much of Southern and 
Eastern Europe, along with most of East Asia, enjoy highly modernized economies but 
still harbor strong familism.  Women in these regions are faced with the same difficulties 
as women in Korea, namely, that of balancing a job and childcare. Yet while fertility in 
Southern and Eastern Europe is very low, both period and cohort fertility seemed to have 
stopped falling in these regions (Mryskala et al. 2012) and have never reached the lowest 
points experienced in East Asia.  Why is fertility saliently lower in East Asia than in 
Southern and Eastern Europe, where fertility levels have recently risen above the 
“lowest-low” TFR threshold of 1.3? 
The title of this article refers to East Asian fertility as a “puzzle” because the 
literature on the topic lacks a thorough and compelling explanation for why East Asian 
families have experienced continual declines in family size.  Popular media and various 
academic sources speculatively point to the high cost of children as driving low fertility, 
but none has been able to provide a convincing case for their suspicions, and careful 
empirical analyses are scarce.  The remainder of this paper draws upon recently published 
quantitative and qualitative data to add credibility to the argument that the high costs 
invested in one’s offspring, specifically in their education, are responsible for partially 
explaining why East Asian fertility persists at such a low level.  As stated, most of our 
analyses and discussion are centered on Korea, though these same driving factors of low 
fertility and more generally, the notion of “quality over quantity” regarding family size, is 
similarly pervasive throughout East Asia. 
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The Missing Piece to the Korean Fertility Puzzle:  Education Fever, 
English Fever, and Competitiveness Fever 
Obsession with education in Korea has become an integral part of contemporary 
Korean culture and affects all aspects of social life.  Deeply rooted Confucian values 
stress education as the best way for achieving high social status and economic prosperity 
(Seth 2002).  Park (2009) argues that more recently, a collapse of the hierarchical social 
class system coupled with egalitarian ideas from the West have created the notion that 
any Korean child can achieve personal advancement, economic prosperity, and social 
mobility through education.  Korean parents widely recognize this and see it as their duty 
to provide their children with the proper educational resources and support in order to 
produce successful and competitive children.  In the mid-1970s as part of their family 
planning project, even the Korean government adopted the notion of “quality over 
quantity” with colorful and creative “population propaganda” exclaiming: “Daughter or 
son, let's not think about which. Just have two and raise them well” (J. Lee 2009).   
 The 1997 economic crisis in Korea is commonly noted for intensifying Korea’s 
competitive environment (see, for example, Eun 2007; Park 2009).  During this time, 
according to Eun (2007), “[job] uncertainty was endemic” and standing out as more 
qualified than others was an absolute necessity in order to receive the best university 
education and later obtain a well-paid, secure job. 
Once illegal for allegedly “promoting social inequality”, hagwons, also known as 
“cram schools” or “private after-school education centers”, were once again permitted by 
the Korean government in the 90s and have been exploding in popularity ever since.  
Students attend hagwon after their regular school hours for additional training in all 
subjects including math, writing, music, science, and perhaps the most common, English.  
Hagwons are seen by many as crucial for admission to one of Korea’s utmost prestigious 
and elite “SKY” universities (Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei 
University).  Sending one’s child to after school activities has become embedded in the 
Korean culture as a social norm.  In fact, over 75% of children in 2009 partook in some 
form of private education (KNSO 2009).  Parents who fail to send their children to these 
additional lessons, i.e. breaking the norm, may even run the risk of being classified as 
irresponsible or even neglectful parents (Lee 2011).   
Hagwons are notoriously expensive and as a result often are cited by parents in 
popular media as a reason why they only have only one or two children (see “Qualitative 
Support” below).  The social pressure to send one’s child or children to hagwons coupled 
with the high cost of private education is likely to deter the idea of a big family.  After all, 
the more children in a family, the fewer financial resources are able to be delegated to 
each child’s education and, as thought by many Korean parents, the less likely their 
children will end up being “successful”.  In an attempt to measure the effect of private 
education expenditures on fertility behavior, we correlate provincial average income 
adjusted education expenditures with the respective regional total fertility rates for the 
year 2009.   
First, we use data from the 2009 Survey of Private Education Expenditure (KNSO 
2009) which reports yearly expenditures on private education for the entire country of 
Korea and each of its 16 provinces.  While the average amount spent on monthly private 
education expenditures equated to 240,000 won ($208) per student in 2009, there was 
great provincial variation in the amount spent, from 160,000 won ($140) per student in 
12 
 
Jeonbuk to 321,000 won ($278) in Seoul.  The 2009 report on “Regional Income 
Estimation” from Statistics Korea reports the personal disposable income (PDI) for Korea 
as a whole as well as for each of the 16 provinces.  The data also shows great variability 
among the different provinces, as the average family in Seoul had nearly 15,800,000 won 
($13,700) while the average family’s personal disposable income in Jeonnam was just 
11,104,000 won ($9,600).  In order to account for provincial income differences, we 
divide the average monthly private education expenditure by the personal disposable 
income for each of the 16 Korean provinces and the country as a whole, thus yielding the 
percent of personal disposable income spent on private education.   
There are various reasons why we focus on a provincial analysis to explain the 
effects of private education expenditures on fertility as opposed to examining the 
relationship on a cross-country analysis.  First, Korea is largely homogeneous which 
make widely differing cultural or societal norms across different provinces unlikely.  
Second, competition to enter university is countrywide; it is equally difficult for all 
students to be accepted into university and therefore private education to enhance 
competitiveness is “equally necessary” across all provinces. Third, the tax structure and 
governmental investment in education is uniform for Korea; the risk of inaccurately 
comparing public and private investments in education in proportion to tax structure and 
income differences across multiple countries would be relatively high.  
We perform a linear regression analysis using the total fertility rate of each 
province, provided by Statistics Korea upon request, and the provincial percent of income 
spent on private education.  The scatter plot with the regression coefficient is found 
below in Figure 2. 
The regression scatter plot (Figure 2) suggests that after income adjustment, 
regions in which parents spend more on education tend to have fewer children than 
regions where parents spend less on their children’s education.   This relationship 
strengthens our hypothesis that there exists a relationship between private education 
expenditures and fertility, where an increase in the former is associated with a decrease in 
the latter.7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 It is generally recognized that high housing costs in Korea are a large financial drain on families, though 
we found no significant correlation between housing costs (as measured by a 2009 Housing Price Index) 
and regional TFRs. 
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Figure 2: % of Personal Disposable Income Spent on Private Education and Provincial Total Fertility Rates 
 
 
(Note: See Appendix 1 for provincial map)  
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Next, in an attempt to examine the relationship between family size and education 
expenditures, we correlate parity percentages (i.e. the percentage of women with one, two 
three, etc. children) with income adjusted private education expenditures by province.  
For this purpose, we gathered data from the 2005 Korean census and calculate the percent 
parities of women aged 45-49 years old in each of the Korean provinces used in figure 4.8    
Since the hypothesis is that “private education expenditures make it financially difficult 
for families to have more than a couple children”, we group the first and second parity 
percentages and the third, fourth and fifth parity percentages to form two aggregate 
statistical groups.9  We then correlate the provincial income adjusted private education 
expenditures with the two groups of parity percentages (“first and second” and “third or 
higher”).   The results are presented in Figure 4.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It can be said with much certainty that the females in the studied age cohort (45-49) have completed 
childbearing.   
9
 Because so few families have more than five children it is statistically insignificant to use above the fifth 
parity percent. 
15 
 
 
Figure 4: % Personal Disposable Income Spent on Private Education Expenditures and Percent Parity Groups 
of Women aged 45-49 by Province 
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Furthermore, Figure 4 supports our hypothesis that private education expenditures 
discourage couples from having families with more than two children.  From the Figure, 
we note that families in provinces with a greater concentration of small families (one or 
two children) spend, on average, more of their PDI on their children’s education while 
families in provinces with a greater concentration of large families (three or more 
children) spend much less of their PDI on their children’s education.  In other words, 
regions with higher percentages of families with one or two children correlate positively 
with higher percentages of PDI spent on private education expenditures.  Conversely, the 
concentration of large families correlates negatively with higher average spending on 
private education. 
When examining the scatter plot in Figure 3, the provinces of Gyeonggi (8) and 
Busan (2) stand out as outliers to the relationship.  In the province of Gyeonggi, both the 
birth rate and the private education expenditure amount are relatively high (a deviance 
from our “high(er) expenditure, low(er) fertility” relationship).  On the other hand, the 
province of Busan has extremely low fertility with a relatively low per household payout 
on private education expenditures.  Geographic location and internal migration are two 
possible factors to explain why Busan and Gyeonggi deviate from the linear relationship.   
Gyeonggi sits in the northern part of South Korea and was home to Seoul until 1943 
when the nation’s capital administratively separated to form a “special city”.  While 
Seoul is the country’s financial and political hub, it lacks the abundance of space and 
security needed to create a family-friendly environment.   For this reason, there has been 
a trend for married couples in their “prime childbearing years” (twenties to thirties) to 
relocate to the suburbs of Seoul (located in Gyeonggi) to start their families while 
commuting to work in Seoul (Statistics Korea Internal Migration 2010).  In 2010 alone 
the province of Gyeonggi gained 142,437 people while Seoul “lost” more than 115,000 
of its citizens, the large majority to Gyeonggi (Statistics Korea Internal Migration 2010).  
The influx of married Seoulite couples in Gyeonggi, many of whom probably have 
children shortly after moving, is the likely reason why fertility is ostensibly higher in 
Gyeonggi than in Seoul.   
Similarly, the southern port city of Busan separated in 1963 from Gyeongnam to 
become its own “distinct administrative entity” or province.  Busan, like Seoul, has a 
large urban to suburban migration pattern of those in their childbearing years; from 2005 
to 2010 over 80,000 of Busan’s residents relocated to its “suburbs” in the province of 
Gyeongnam (KSNO 2010).  The notion that couples in Korea’s two largest cities, Seoul 
and Busan, leave the big cities to have children in the “satellite cities” naturally boosts 
the fertility rates in their suburbs (Gyeonggi and Gyeongnam, respectively) while having 
an equal but opposite effect on the fertility rates in the cities.   
 
Qualitative Support 
 From the quantitative results above, it is evident that there exist statistically 
significant relationships between (1) private education expenditures and total fertility 
rates by province and (2) private education expenditures by region and family size.  In 
addition to these relationships, various surveys and interviews strongly buttress the 
hypothesis that private education expenditures lower the average Korean couple’s 
proclivity to have more than just one or two children.  
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 J. Lee (2009) quotes a report from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Issues 
which stated that “economic climate is one of the factors that has ‘especially played a 
role in people’s delaying or giving up on having children’”. 
 A survey by the Korean National Statistics Office asked householders about the 
“difficulties in educating primary school students” (KNSO 2007).  More than 77% of the 
respondents reported the “burden of expense in private education and daily life” as the 
main difficulty in educating primary school students, followed by 9% who said the main 
difficulty in educating primary school students was “balancing between children and 
social life”.   
 The most recent social survey from the KNSO (2011) polled the “awareness of 
child education expenditure burden” in Korea.  The survey revealed that 37.4% of 
respondents view education expenditures as a “heavy burden”, 40% as a “substantial 
burden”, 16.6% as “average” and only 5% as “slightly or not a burden”.  
 Personal accounts in mainstream media along with documented interviews also 
consistently report that the extreme cost of raising children causes couples to make the 
conscious decision to stop having more than one or two.  For example, a 2011 article in 
Channel NewsAsia cites Noo Suh Kyung, a housewife with two children, who says that 
“It's very difficult to raise two children. We thought about a third child but after doing 
the calculations and realising how much it would cost to raise three children all the way 
to college, we knew it would be impossible. And so we gave up the idea." (Suk 2011).  In 
the same article, Lee Ko Woon, a Korean mother of one, states that "I don't think we can 
have more children. It just costs so much to educate them. The government is offering no 
incentives and yet it keeps urging people to have more children." (Suk 2011).  
 Lastly, a 2012 survey by the Health Ministry showed that nine out of 10 people in 
Korea say the country’s low fertility rate is “serious, but [people] are reluctant to have 
children due to financial problems” (Ji-Sook 2012).  Respondents of the survey said 
“education costs including private education fees was the most burdensome expense”, 
and as Ji-Sook (2012) explains, “found it hard to balance family and work”. 
 
English Fever and Competitiveness Fever 
The phenomena of “English fever” and “competitiveness fever” merit discussion 
in this paper because they shed further light on the parental fervor to produce successful 
children.  As touched upon earlier, the 1997 Asian financial crisis intensified the 
competitive environment in Korea (Eun 2007) and has led parents to take over-the-top 
measures to ensure their children are competitive and do not have to face the economic 
hardships they did.  The extent to which parents go in creating successful children has 
transcended the formal educational realm and is now the root of two Korean cultural 
peculiarities known as the “geese father phenomenon” and “competitive parenting”.   
To best understand the reasoning behind the “geese father phenomenon”, one 
must understand the importance of the English language in contemporary Korean culture.  
Speaking English in Korea is not simply a chic status symbol anymore, but a necessary 
qualification to stand out as competitive in the job market.  Park (2009) identifies three 
historical reasons why Koreans see fluency in English as so important:  First, the Korean 
government has instituted a number of policy changes which place a greater emphasis on 
learning English.  Among these include the introduction of a listening section to the 
national college entry examinations and a shift from more “grammar based” exams to 
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exams based on “communicative English”.  Second, according to Park (2009), the 
introduction of English “in all [Korean] elementary schools” in 1995 prompted parents to 
seek out of school resources such as “English-only private institutions, English learning 
materials for kids, and English conversation services”.  And third, the Seoul Olympic 
Games and 1997 Korean financial crisis illustrated how important a solid grasp on the 
English language was in a globalized world.  As a result, the “English fever” 
phenomenon has gripped Korea, causing some people to take unique, almost eccentric 
steps to ensure their children speak English fluently.   
The Korean phenomenon of “girogi appa”, or “(wild) geese fathers”, refers to a 
growing number of Korean fathers who send their children and wives to English speaking 
countries while retaining their jobs in Korea (Eun 2007).  The geese fathers generally 
visit (or “migrate to”) their families on a yearly basis.  While no official numbers exist, a 
recent New York Times article estimates that a staggering 40,000 South Korean 
schoolchildren live abroad with their mothers while their fathers work in Korea (Onishi 
2008).  Geese families reflect the sacrifices made by Korean parents to ensure that their 
children are multilingual and receive a “competitive edge” through a foreign education, 
as “foreign diplomas are often regarded as superior to a Korean education” (Eun 2007).     
Within Korea, English fever has even led to what some call “competitive 
parenting”. Because Korean parents see their children’s success as a reflection of their 
parental efforts, parents compete amongst themselves to enroll their children in the best 
hagwons, English language courses, or day-care centers.  As Shin Dongpyo states in a 
televised PBS special on education in Korea “You see your neighbor's kid speak better 
English than your kid, and you try to figure out what kind of English program he is 
getting and what kind of kindergarten he is attending. You have figured it out, and you 
send your kid to same kindergarten -- that kind of competition going on.” (PBS 2011). 
Competitive parenting itself illustrates the broad cultural notion that parents can take 
certain measures to ensure their offspring attain high social and economic status.   
 
Education Fever and in Other Parts of East Asia 
Though the following surveys and data are not standardized and therefore cross-
country enrollment rates cannot be compared, they provide credence to the claim that 
education fever is indeed ubiquitous throughout East Asia:  in Hong Kong surveys 
conducted in 2009 indicate that about 72.5% of primary students and 85% of secondary 
students received some form of private tutoring (Ngai and Cheung 2010; Caritas 2010).  
An education panel survey in Taipei (Taiwan) found that approximately 73% of grade 7 
students were receiving about 6.5 hours per week of private tutoring (Liu 2012).  
Although official statistics in Singapore do not exist, Tan (2009) notes that the 
“phenomenon had been visible for some decades” -- a statement which is corroborated by 
a 2008 newspaper poll which found that 97% of students were receiving some kind of 
private tutoring (Toh 2008; Bray 2012).  And in Japan, a survey found that 65.2% of 
junior secondary 3 students attended juku (Japanese cram schools) in 2007 (Japan 2008: 
13).   
Like education fever, English fever is endemic throughout East Asia (Krashen 
2006).  “In Taiwan and elsewhere”, writes Witten-Davies (2006), “[people] have been 
starting English earlier, sending children to extra classes (‘cram schools’), hiring tutors 
and studying abroad”.  Liu (2002) calls studying English a “national obsession” in 
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Taiwan, while Chang (2003) notes the eagerness of parents to sign their kids up for 
English classes in Kindergarten or grade one.  In Hong Kong, English is presumed to be 
in greatest demand because it is “not only [important] as a subject but also as a medium 
of instruction for other subjects” (Bray 2003).  While cram schools in Japan do teach 
English, the Japanese are not as fervent about learning English as their East Asian 
counterparts. 
Though these two trends are widespread within East Asia, Takayasu (2003 and 
2005) argues that there is significant variation in the intensity of education obsession 
throughout the region.  Behind this variation lie cultural, demographic, and economic 
factors.  
Many isolated cultural elements make education fever “hotter” in some Asian 
countries.  In Korea’s case, many scholars consider Korea as the “most Confucius” 
country in East Asia (Berthrong and Berthrong 2002), so it should come as little surprise 
that one of the pillars of Confucianism, education, is likewise strongest in Korea.  For 
Japan, the notoriously independent-minded attitude of the Japanese toward the rest of the 
world may explain why they are less fanatical about learning English (Beck and Durrajic 
2010; Park 2009).  Differences in living standards between individuals with different 
educational attainment levels are more pronounced in some societies, particularly in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, making the “rewards from extra levels of schooling, and from 
supplementary tutoring…greater in some Asian societies” (Bray 1999). 
Secondly, as Takayasu (2003) suggests, demography may help explain why 
Japan’s case of education fever has “cooled down” over the last decade and a half in 
comparison with other countries in the region.  Japan’s fertility rate has been below-
replacement over a long period of time (since 1974), which invariably translates into 
smaller birth cohorts and reduced competition for university spots.  Compared to Japan, 
fertility rates (and sizes of birth cohorts) have declined more recently in other East Asian 
countries, the educational environment remains very competitive, and demand for 
additional private, out-of-school tutoring remains strikingly high.   
Lastly, related to Dore’s hypothesis (1976) that late development is linked with a 
greater societal emphasis on education, the “compressed” development stories of the 
Asian Tigers differs from that of Japan, which, while also considered a “latecomer to 
industrialization”, was an “economic superpower long before South Korea” (Takayasu 
2003).  In the Tiger countries (Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea), 
intergenerational experiences regarding wealth and opportunities have been starkly 
different for the pre-development (before 1960s), in-transition (1960s-1980s), and post-
development (1990s-present) generations.  The oldest generation (“the grandparents” of 
today) grew up in an impoverished environment lacking economic opportunity and social 
mobility; the sandwich generation (“the parents”) were born into a world of social and 
economic transition in which the value of education became an overtly important 
requisite for success in a country with more people than well-paid jobs; and today’s 
children and teens have inherited their parent’s (the “sandwich” generation’s) education 
fever mentality.  Interestingly, similar patterns are occurring in Eastern Europe, where the 
fall of socialism and the subsequent quick prospect of social mobility have led to a 
“rapidly-spreading” phenomenon of private tutoring (Silova 2010; Bray 2001). 
As we’ve highlighted with regard to Myrskylä et al.’s cohort fertility projections, 
a unique feature regarding fertility in Japan is its expected plateauing, as opposed to 
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further (expected) declines in fertility in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Explaining 
these trends in fertility behavior may be a result of these cultural, demographic and 
economic factors.  Less intense education fever due to a less emphasis on Confucian 
values, smaller birth cohorts and less competition, and weaker intergenerational 
differences in wealth may explain why parents in Japan are less zealous about producing 
ultra-competitive kids.  This comparatively lower level of competition may explain why 
family size is not expected to shrink further in Japan. 
   
Discussion and Conclusions 
 High household gender inequality prevalent in Korea (and East Asia) discourages 
educated, career oriented and independent females from seeking marriage. Women who 
do decide to marry often find themselves carrying a “double burden” of working and 
managing the majority of household tasks (or “unpaid work”), making the prospects of a 
large family both stressful and unmanageable (Kim 2005).  These difficulties are faced by 
women in Southern European strong familism societies where fertility is also very low, 
but not as low as Korean fertility… 
Because Korean parents take a larger responsibility in their offspring’s future 
success compared to Western parents, the notion of “quality over quantity” is presumably 
more pervasive and influential in determining family size in the country. Given the high 
social pressure felt by parents to invest large amounts of time and money in their 
child(ren)’s education, Korean parents often find it difficult and discouraging to have 
more than one or two children, despite the fact that desired family size for young adults 
has hovered around two for the last three decades (Jun 2005; Nishimura 2012).  Thus, 
what separates Korea from low-fertility countries in the West, similar in economic 
development and familial structure, is the steadfast parental drive to produce super-
educated, competitive children. In such a competitive country, the average Korean 
parents are often willing to forego their ideal family size for fewer children so that they 
can maximize their children’s success later in life.   
The constant pressure felt by Korean parents to ensure their children lead 
successful lives drives parents to spend large amounts of time and money on their 
offspring.  Korean parents simply wish the best for their children’s futures; the measures 
they take to produce competitive children, now both within and outside of the academic 
realm, are to put their children on a successful path.   
 What will the future hold for fertility in Korea?  Above all, one must bear in mind 
that the reduction in the pace of postponement could increase fertility rates slightly by 
reducing tempo effects.   Additionally, new governmental provisions to create a child-
friendly environment will likely raise the fertility rate if the measures are successful in 
making it easier for women to balance a work and home life.    
Yet because “competition” for university spots is only relative and the labor 
market is inelastic, high test scores or the ability to speak English mean little if everyone 
else has similar qualifications.10 It is this principle which has driven and will continue to 
drive parents to participate in over the top practices to ensure that their children will 
outperform, outscore, and out-qualify the rest.   
                                                 
10
 Indeed Korean students have achieved very high test scores.  In fact, Korean “education fever” has given the country 
the top spot on the PISA Education literacy comparison (OECD 2011a).   
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  Further research is likely to confirm our presumption that the relationship 
between low fertility and expenditures on private education is applicable to other 
countries in the region, as parents in many other East Asian countries anecdotally stress 
“quality over quantity” more than Western parents, place very high importance on 
education in their children’s lives, and take measures similar to those Koreans take to 
ensure their children are successful and competitive.  If the notion of child quality over 
quantity is indeed more intense in East Asia than the rest of the developed world, are East 
Asian countries destined to persistently have the world’s lowest fertility rates? 11   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This paper does not examine the possibility of the Easterlin effect on the future of South Korean fertility.   Pampel 
and Peters (1995) concisely define the Easterlin effect as “cyclical changes in demographic and social behavior as the 
result of fluctuations in birth rates and cohort size during the post-World War II period”.  The Easterlin effect argues 
that as cohort sizes fluctuate, so do family structures, income, career and education competition, and fertility rates 
(Easterlin 1973; Waldorf and Franklin 2002; Pampel and Peters 1995).  The “effect” has received both praise and 
criticism and is said to be “mixed at best and plain wrong at worst” (Pampel and Peters 1995).  If the Easterlin effect 
were to apply to Korea, the country would likely experience cyclical periods of high and low fertility and thus the 
current period of lowest-low fertility would simply be an ephemeral phase. Further research is needed to examine if 
smaller future cohort sizes will indeed loosen competition in both the academic and labor realms.  Furthermore, if 
smaller cohorts have higher income, will the burden of educational expenditures be as high as it currently is?  And 
lastly, will social norms change to foster greater gender equality, a less traditional family structure, and a more child-
friendly environment?  Such possibilities would surely have consequences on the country’s fertility rate. 
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